Dans le cadre de notre séminaire « La Cybersécurité sur un plateau » (Cybersecurity on a Plate), nous aurons deux interventions le mardi 30 janvier prochain. Le séminaire CoaP aura lieu à 10h dans le bâtiment IMT/TP/TSP, en salle 3.A213.
Si vous venez participer pour la première fois, n'hésitez pas à contacter les organisateurs pour ne pas être bloqué à l'entrée.
Sara Tucci - Blockchain Consensus Protocols, from Bitcoin to Ethereum 2.0
Bitcoin introduced a fully decentralized, peer-to-peer consensus protocol that enables secure transaction validation in an open network, marking a departure from previous Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) protocols primarily designed for closed networks. An innovative combination of cryptographic and incentive mechanisms ensures the protocol’s robustness over the years. However, it’s important to acknowledge the considerable energy consumption of Bitcoin’s Proof-of-Work mechanism, which remains a significant concern. To address these energy concerns, there have been efforts to transition to more environmentally friendly solutions, such as Proof-of-Stake BFT protocols, like Ethereum 2.0. While these newer proposals hold promise in terms of energy efficiency, they come with complexities and ongoing issues in security and incentive design. In this talk I will present the main features and differences of Proof-Stake-BFT proposals with respect to Bitcoin, to appreciate their maturity and outline open issues and ongoing research challenges.
Adam Oumar ABDEL-RAHMAN - A Privacy-Preserving Infrastructure to Monitor Encrypted DNS Logs
In the realm of cybersecurity, logging system and application activity is a crucial technique to detect and understand cyberattacks by identifying Indicators of Compromise (IoCs). Since these logs can take vast amounts of disk space, it can be tempting to delegate their storage to an external service provider. This requires to encrypt the data, so the service provider does not have access to possibly sensitive information. However, this usually makes it impossible to search for relevant information in the encrypted log. To address this predicament, this paper delves into the realm of modern cryptographic tools to reconcile the dual objectives of protecting log data from prying eyes while enabling controlled processing. We propose a comprehensive framework that contextualizes log data and presents several mechanisms to solve the outsourcing problem, allowing searchable encryption, and we apply our approach to DNS logs. Our contributions include the introduction of two novel schemes, namely symmetric and asymmetric, which facilitate efficient and secure retrieval of intrusion detection-related information from encrypted outsourced storage. Furthermore, we conduct extensive experiments on a test bed to evaluate and compare the effectiveness of the different solutions, providing valuable insights into the practical implementation of our proposed infrastructure for monitoring.